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Mind the GAP: Tailoring the Form and
Substance of Political Risk Insurance in Order
to Bridge the 'Enforcement Gap'
in Investment Arbitration
RAVI D. SOOPRAMANEN*

I.

Introduction

Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") emerged from the shadows of the
Bretton Woods negotiations. Theirs is a story linked in particular to the
World Bank Group and its attempts to depoliticize investment. Prior
attempts to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment have failed in
the years following Bretton Woods.' The earliest iterations of some of the
core substantive investor protection provisions found in modem-day BITs,
notably the obligation to treat foreign investments fairly and equitably, can
be traced back to the 1948 Havana Charter.2 The Charter, however, ran
counter to the Calvo Doctrine, espoused by an influential subset of
developing countries at the time. This Doctrine provided that
"international law should not grant more protection to foreigners than
national treatment under domestic law."3 In the absence of tribunals,
investment disputes in those days were resolved by gunboat diplomacy or,
increasingly, through the good offices of Eugene Black, the World Bank
* Ravi Soopramanien is an attorney-at-law. He previously served as a Legal Officer at the
African Development Bank's Energy, Environment and Climate Change (ONEC) Department,
where he advised the Bank's government clients on political risk products. The author
gratefully acknowledges Profs. Alan 0. Sykes, Jonathan Greenberg, Dan Reicher, and Jeffrey D.
Brown of Stanford Law School for their comments on the research papers that laid the
groundwork for the present article.
1. See, for instance, the discussion of the failed International Trade Organization (ITO)
LIPSON, STANDING GuARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
Charter in CHARLEs
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIEs 86-87 (University of California Press, Berkeley
1985).
2. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charterfor an InternationalTrade
Organization:Final Act and Related Documents, Art. 93(2), U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24,
1948), later stalled attempts include the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad and the
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. See Herman Abs and Hartley
Shawcross, The ProposedConvention to ProtectPrivate ForeignInvestment:A Round Table, 9 J. Pun.
L. 115, 117 (Spring 1960), and OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Propertyart.
7(b), 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968).
3. Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation?On the Literature and Sociology of International
Investment Law, 22 EuR. J. INT'L L. 873, 901 (2011).
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President from 1949 to 1962.4 Black was called upon to arbitrate
investment-related disputes relating to the sequestration of British property
in the United Arab Republic, the rights of English and French shareholders
in the Suez Canal Company, the payments due to French bond holders of
1912 Tokyo City bonds, and the contested trans-boundary water rights
leading to the Indus Water Treaty.5
Black's role as the world's foremost investment arbitrator positioned the
World Bank to push for the adoption of the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
("ICSID Convention").6 The fact that the ICSID was artfully presented to
the World Bank's Member Countries in 1965 as an attempt to streamline the
World Bank's role in investment disputes7 should not detract from its focus
on political risk.8 Unlike the failed investment-related conventions that
preceded it, the ICSID Convention did not codify any substantive investor
protections. Rather, it sought to provide a neutral forum for the
adjudication of investor-state disputes.9 The World Bank expected that
recourse by states and investors to the forum would, in time, lower political
risk and promote foreign direct investment ("FDI"), particularly for largescale projects vulnerable to expropriation.o
ICSID was designed to apply to investor-state disputes on a case-by-case
basis. Ratification did not oblige Member Countries to use the ICSID.
Rather, such obligation would only arise where a Member Country explicitly
consented, in its capacity as host state, to ICSID arbitration." Such consent
would typically be contained in contracts individually negotiated between
the host state and an investor (hereafter, a "Contract Investor"). These
contracts, generally lengthy,12 would contain a dispute settlement clause
addressing the host state's consent to ICSID arbitration, carefully list the
host state's counterparty obligations, and explicitly highlight those actions
4. See Eugene Robert Black, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/
archives/history/past-presidents/eugene-robert-black (last visited June 25, 2017).
5. Tobias M.C. Asser, The World Bank, 7 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 207, 209 (1972).
6. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States [ICSID], Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
7. Aaron Broches, Settlement of Disputes between Governments and Private Parties, in HISTORY
OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 1, 1-3 (2009).

8. As distinguished from commercial risks covering, inter alia, construction and operational
risks, excessive maintenance costs, and insufficient sales to satisfy debt repayment obligations.
9. See the remarks of former ICSID Secretary-GeneralRobert Danino, ICSID - A Forumfor the
Resolution of International Legal Disputes Through Arbitration and Conciliation, 1 - 2 (Nov. 16,
2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/214576-113960430
6966/20817156/ParisICSID.pdf.
10. John T. Schmidt, Arbitration under the Auspices of the InternationalCentrefor the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. v. Government offamaica, 17 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 90, 90 (1976).
11. See, on this point, the analysis of ICSID Art. 25(1) in the dissenting opinion of Laurence
Boisseon de Chazournes in Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/2 0,
available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/2176#sthash.vfFSoNjp.dpuf.
12. A typical water concession contract will run some 110 pages in length, excluding annexes.
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and inactions by the host state amounting to a default.13 The proliferation of
BITs, however, changed the nature of arbitration. The intended safety valve,
of explicit government consent in contracts, was blown wide open through
deemed consent in BITs. Any investor with a qualifying investment pursuant
to a BIT (hereafter, a "BIT investor"), irrespective of any direct contractual
relationship with the host state, could signal acceptance to the state's consent
to arbitration in a BIT, and initiate an investor-state dispute under the
ICSID.'4 As these disputes continue to grow in numbers and complexity,
attention is now being paid to the difficulty of securing enforcement of
arbitral awards (the so-called "enforcement gap").15

This paper will posit that there is no easy solution to the enforcement gap
within the international investment legal framework. This framework
functions smoothly insofar as Member Countries obey the rules. This is
because the system is, normatively, predicated on state consent. Where a
sovereign state refuses to honor an arbitral award, there are few legal
remedies available to award-creditors. Indeed, the ICSID was never
designed to be a self-contained system of recognition and enforcement
replete with police powers allowing it to remedy the full range of political
risks an investor could encounter abroad.16 Rather, it formed part of a suite
of risk mitigation initiatives provided by each institution forming the World
Bank Group,17 none more important than the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"). The MIGA was established to encourage the
flow of foreign investment to developing countries by providing a range of
political risk insurance ("PRI") products covering an investor's equity and/or

13. For an example of the structure of such agreements, see World Bank, General conditions
applicable to loan and guaranteeagreements(World Bank, Washington DC 2012), available at http:/

The
/siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/IBRDGC-English_12.pdf.
dispute settlement provisions are contained in Art. VIII. Note that project agreements are
sometimes modeled after the World Bank GCs. The actual agreements contain specific
conditions that add considerably to the length of the final product. These contracts, which tend
to be confidential, are sometimes implemented by the Contracting State in domestic laws.
14. Subject, of course, to the BIT providing for ICSID arbitration.
LAW REGIME GOVERNING
15. JOSE ALvAREz, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 131 (Hague Academy of International Law, 2011).
16. See, for instance, the discussion of the limits of ICSID Art. 55, in CHRISTOPH SHREUER ET
AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1152 - 54 (Cambridge University Press 2d

ed. 2009). For a more optimistic assessment, see Melanie Willems, ICSID Arbitrators - The
World'sPolicemen?,MONDAQ (Oct. 13, 2015), available at http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
x/43 3 526/International+Courts+Tribunals/ICSID+Arbitrators+The+Worlds+Policemen.
17. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), International
Finance Corporation ("IFC"), and International Development Agency ("IDA") all initially
established with the goal of reconstructing post-war economies, now provide financing and
advisory services with the aim of leveraging foreign infrastructure investment. Over the past
two decades, the IFC, IBRD, and IDA have provided Partial Risk and Credit Guarantee
products to Member Countries that cover political risks similar to the MIGA PRI instruments
discussed in more detail throughout this paper.
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debt exposure in a given project.18 A Contract investor could (and many
would) insure a host state's commitments through a MIGA PRI policy
covering currency inconvertibility, political violence, and expropriation
risks, in addition to arbitration agreement defaults ("AAD") and denials of
justice ("DOJ").
BITs have upset the equilibrium between investment arbitration and the
PRI market. As a consequence, the latter has grown at a comparatively
slower pace: it is only recently, as states have transitioned away from
outright expropriations and towards subtler regulatory "takings," that the
market has provided BIT investors with the types of affordable policies
covering risks from currency inconvertibility, political violence, and
expropriation available to Contract investors decades back. Accordingly,
while some of these forms of coverage are now available to BIT investors, no
PRI provider at present extends the relatively more recent AAD or DOJ
products to BIT investors.'9 AAD and DOJ coverage is only available to
those Contract investors with a direct contractual relationship with the host
state. 20 This paper will argue that there is no good reason to narrow AAD
and DOJ coverage in such a manner.
Rather than putting all their eggs in the BIT basket, this paper urges BIT
investors to seek out PRI products selectively, to plug gaps in investment
protections contained in a given BIT. Where such gaps relate to the
"enforcement gap" problem discussed above, BIT investors should lobby
PRI providers to extend AAD and DOJ product coverage to them, in
exchange for fair remuneration. This paper will posit that the failure by the
PRI market to provide coverage to close the enforcement gap has had, inter
alia, the consequence of fueling a market for third party funding ("TPF"),
and represents revenues foregone by PRI providers. Part II of this paper will
describe the enforcement gap in more detail. Part Ell will present the PRI
landscape. Part IV will outline possible risk mitigation strategies available to
BIT investors. Part V will conclude with recommendations.
II.

The Enforcement Gap

A.

KEY ELEMENTS OF

BITs

BITs were designed to resolve the problem of obsolescence bargaining in
investment negotiations. Obsolescence bargaining describes a phenomenon
whereby the negotiating leverage for private projects shifts during the
project lifecycle. Prior to its investment, the investor is in a stronger
position, as it has capital to spend, and can shop around to negotiate better
18. MIGA was also created with an eye towards plugging a gap in state-operated national
insurance programs open only to nationals or exports. I included both MIGA and national

insurance providers as "public PRI providers."
19. A point explored in detail in Kenneth Hansen, A BIT of Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 3, 9 - 10 (Theodore Moran, Gerald West, Keith Martin eds.,

2008).
20. Id.
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concessions. The host state needs private investors, and offers attractive
concessions. After its investment, however, the tables turn, and the investor
becomes the weaker party: once operational, the investor requires a long
amortization period to attain its expected return, whereas the host state has
already secured all it needs. The original bargain has, thus, become
obsolete. Theory predicts that the host state will force a change in terms, by
terminating or unilaterally modifying its negotiated concessions over time.21
BITs typically reduce obsolescence bargaining risks by incorporating six
core elements. First, they provide that covered investments receive "fair and
equitable" treatment ("FET") pursuant to at least the minimum standard of
international customary law.22 Second, they address the host state's
obligation to compensate the investor for direct or indirect expropriation.
Third, they incorporate National Treatment ("NT") and Most Favored
Nation ("MFN") obligations binding the host state to treat BIT investors no
less favorably than "like" foreign and local investors.23 Fourth, they
guarantee the right by investors to transfer their investments and the returns
therefrom into a freely convertible currency. Fifth, they incorporate socalled "umbrella" clauses seeking to extend the host state's liability to "any
dispute relating to [covered] investments."24 Last, they provide for binding
third-party arbitration of disputes between investor and home state, and
home state and host state. 25
It bears mentioning that more recent BITs sometimes contain an
additional element that dilutes the value of these protections: so-called nonprecluded measures ("NPM") clauses allowing state parties to take otherwise
non-BIT-conforming measures "necessary" to protect their environment
and essential security interests.26

B.

PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL

AwARDs

When things go wrong, access to justice under BITs can be slow and
expensive. Recent estimates indicate that the mean length of time between
21. DAVID G. VICTOR & THOMAS C. HELLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POWER
SECTOR REFORM 10 (Cambridge University Press, 2007) (citing RAYMOND VERNON,
SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US ENTERPRISE 46 (Longman,
1971)).
22. See OECD, Fairand Equitable Treatment Standardin InternationalInvestment Law, (OECD
Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/03 OECD Publishing), available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435.
23. NT will entitle investors to treatment "not less favorable" than that accorded to like
investors of the host state. MFN will require that investors from the home state be treated no
less favorably than like investors from other states.
24. See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Paper No. 2006/03,
2006), https://'www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2006_3.pdf.
25. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 621, 631 (1998).
26. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, arts. 12 & 18 (2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
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filing an ICSID claim and obtaining final judgment is 1325 days (three years
and seven months).27 Annulment proceedings can add anywhere between
one to two and a half years to this timetable.28 The average costs for a
claimant in investment treaty arbitration is $4.5 million.29 As ICSID
tribunals have broad discretion to apportion costs as they deem fit, these
litigation costs do not necessarily follow the event. 30 At least one study finds
that the odds statistically do not favor the investor.31 These delays have at
least as much to do with stalling tactics by respondent host states, looking to
bleed investors, as they do with the open-ended character of BIT terms: to
what extent can an investor argue that domestic regulation depriving its
commercial operations of some measure of economic benefit amounts to an
expropriation? Can an investor establish a violation of NT or MFN
obligation in situations where there are no "like" host or third state
investors? When are investors "unlike?" To what extent does a facially
neutral regulation breach the FET obligation, and how is the relevant
customary international law standard to be measured?32
Assuming an investor mobilizes a large enough war chest to fund its
litigation before an ICSID tribunal-and possibly annulment chamber-and
secures a favorable award (covering, inter alia, its litigation costs), it does not
necessarily follow that this award is "final" in the strictest sense of the word.
A growing number of host states have refused to honor arbitral awards.
Known33 defaulting states include Argentina, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Further, it is
reported that Ecuador, Canada, Chile, South Africa, Lebanon, Latvia,
Mexico, and Poland have previously honored awards or reached a settlement
after first seeking to exhaust all remedies by seeking vacature of arbitral
27. Pieter Bekker & Akiko Ogawa, The Impact of BilateralInvestment Treaty (BI) Proliferation
on Demandfor Investment Insurance: Reassessing PoliticalRisk Insurance After the 'BIT Bang', 28
ICSID REv. 314, 327 (2013) (citing Sarah Macrory, ICSID Arbitration: how long does it take?,
GLOB. ARB. REv. (2009)).
28. See Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Petroecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/10, INT'L CTR.
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DisPUTES (2008), https://www.italaw.com/cases/4846. Litigation
lasted from July 15, 2004 (request registered) to Jan. 8, 2007 (decision rendered).
29. Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOB. ARB. REV.
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Counting-the-costsof
_investmenttreaty.pdf. (Costs for respondents average $100,000 more than the figure for
claimants. When including tribunal costs, the median is around $6 million. The average award
is $76 million (with a median of around $10.7 million)).
30. ICSID, supra note 6, art. 61(2). (Indeed, an earlier draft of the ICSID Convention
established a "pay your own way" approach.).
31. Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, PredictingOutcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
65 DuKE L. J. 459, 467 (2016). (The authors find that sixty percent of investment treaty awards
favor the state; further, the average damage award for investors was $10.9 million. These
awards tend to be lower than the amounts initially claimed.).
32. Simon Lester, Rethinking the InternationalInvestment Law System, 49 J. WORLD TRADE
211, 214 (2015).
33. Not all arbitrations and awards are publicly reported, although unpaid awards tend to
reach the public record once award-creditors seek execution in domestic courts.
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rulings in protracted litigation before the courts of the arbitral seat. 34
Attention to the risks of arbitral defaults has grown to such an extent that the
World Bank now incorporates countries' adherence to arbitration into its
enforcing contracts indicators in its "Doing Business" Guide.35 One study,
synthesizing the results of a survey completed by in-house counsels of
corporations that participated in international arbitrations, found that
nineteen percent of corporations surveyed had to go through enforcement
proceedings against states in domestic courts. Of these corporations, fortysix percent encountered "serious" enforcement difficulties. As to the nature
of these difficulties, sixty-eight percent indicated that they could not identify
assets of the host state, whereas thirteen percent ran into immunity-related
obstacles.36
The ICSID Convention requires all Member Countries to:
recognize an award rendered pursuant to the Convention as binding
and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A
Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an
award in or through the federal courts and may provide that such courts
shall treat the award is if it were a final judgment of the courts of a
constituent state.37
Defenses to enforcement of a final judgment in national courts can
include exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, such as fraud, due
process flaws and deceptive or unfair conduct by an adverse party.38
United States implementing legislation provides that "pecuniary
obligations imposed by [an ICSID] award shall be enforced and shall be
given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a
court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States."39 Such judgments
can be set aside, inter alia, on grounds set out in Rule 60(b) of the Federal
34. In arbitral proceedings subject to UNCITRAL rules. See Luke Peterson, How Many States
Are Not Paying Awards Under Investment Treaties? INv. ARB. REP. (May 7, 2010). (It bears
mentioning that host states are more inclined to comply with ICSID awards.). See Lucy REED,
JAN PAULSSON, & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 186 - 87 (Kluwer Law
International: Den Haag, 2nd ed. 2010) (listing Congo, Senegal, Liberia, and Kazakhstan as the
only Member Countries against which award-creditors had to pursue execution proceedings).
35. World Bank Group, Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency,
DOING BusIN'Ess 18 (2016), http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Busi
ness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB 16-Full-Report.pdf.
36. Crina Baltag, EnforcementofArbitralAwardsAgainstStates, 19 REv. OF INT'L ARB. 391, 405
(2008) (The remaining sixty percent indicated that the subject matter of the dispute was deemed
non-arbitrable. No further studies seem to have been performed on the subject.).
37. Emphasis added by author to ICSID, supra note 6, art. 54(1).
38. See James W. Barratt & Margarita N. Michael, The 'Automatic' Enforcement of ICSID
Awards: The Elephant in the Room?, 2 THE EuR., MIDDLE E. AND AFR. ARB. REv. (2014) (This
part of the paper focuses on United States implementing legislation. The reader may find it
instructive to compare with the largely analogous provisions of the United Kingdom
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act to this article.).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) (2012).
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Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). These grounds, which cover instances
of mistake and fraud, residually allow a court to decline enforcement of an
award on "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."0 These grounds, further, are far broader in scope than the more
limited grounds of appeal available in an appeal to an ICSID Annulment
Committee.41 Federal Court practice under Rule 60(b) FRCP reveals that a
very small number of judgments have been set aside.42 None to date has
related to ICSID awards.43 Nevertheless, subject to the particular
circumstances surrounding proceedings leading to a given ICSID award,
analogous provisions to Rule 60(b) in other ICSID Member Countries may
allow domestic courts the possibility to vacate ICSID judgments that offend
principles of due process and natural justice.4 This is, unquestionably, an
important check against arbitral abuses: indeed, as increasing attention is
being paid to undisclosed conflicts of interests of serving arbitrators, the
possibility that a national court may strike down an arbitral award on such
grounds is more than just theoretical. Where such challenges have been
raised by respondent host states in the past, however, it is fair to assert that
quite a few have been influenced more by litigation tactics than good faith
concerns about the fairness of arbitral proceedings.45
Before turning to the issue of state immunities, it bears mentioning that,
while United States courts have declined to extend the scope of Rule 60(b)
FRCP beyond the bounds of due process, the public policy of other Member
Countries can also frustrate an award-creditor's attempts to enforce arbitral
awards. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Debt Relief (Developing
Countries) Act 2010 limits the amount that private creditors can recover
against heavily indebted poor countries ("HIPCs") in actions initiated in
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) reads: "[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief."

41. ICSID, supra note 6, art. 52(1). (ISCID Art. 52(1) allows a party to seek annulment,
exhaustively under grounds that: "(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.").
42. Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor, & Michael Nolan, Limits to Enforcement ofICSID Awards,

23(1)

J.

INT'L AnB. 1, 9-14 (2006).

43. Id.
44. Id. at 13-14. (The authors discuss equivalent provisions of the French Code of Civil
Procedure, the Columbian Procedure Code, and the Chilean Procedure Code. This list of
Member Countries is not exhaustive.).
45. See Peterson, supra note 34.
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English courts. 6 Such initiatives, well intentioned as they are, may present
some moral hazard risks for HIPC countries in their capacity as host nations,
particularly where the bulk of their assets abroad reside in a state that has
adopted similar legislation similar to that of the United Kingdom Debt

Relief Act of 2010.47
Leaving aside the possibility of vacature under provisions similar in scope
and operation to Rule 60(b) FRCP, the ICSID Convention clarifies that
nothing in its final judgment rule "shall be construed as derogating from the
law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of
any foreign state from execution."48 This provision reveals an asymmetry in
state immunities under ICSID: participation in ICSID arbitration waives
sovereign immunity from suit, but not from execution. The ICSID Model
Clauses contemplate the possibility of an explicit waiver by the host state of
immunity from execution.49 In practice, very few states issue waivers, ex ante
or ex post. Further, national courts, deferring to the executive's prerogative
in matters of foreign relations or for reasons of comity, are sometimes
recalcitrant to acknowledge these waivers.5o In practice, this can require an
awardee to "scour the globe in search of assets in an ICSID Contracting
State and determine if that state's laws on sovereign immunity do not shield
the assets from attachment in aid of execution."s1 Even if such awardee
ultimately finds qualifying assets, the litigation fees expended in domestic
courts throughout the globe following challenges raised either by the
respondent or court, sua sponte, may not, practically or in principle, be
recoverable.
In the United States, only Federal Courts can execute judgments against
sovereign assets. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") codified a
shift in the treatment of sovereign assets from absolute immunity to
restrictive immunity. Under the FSIA, any property belonging to a state
that is used for commercial activity can, in principle, be attached in aid of
execution of an ICSID judgment.52 The burden lies with the award-creditor
46. James W. Barratt & Margarita N. Michael, Degrees of Immunity: A Lisson from the Privy
Council, 2 Ti-E EuR. MIDDLE E. AND AFR. ARi. REv. 6 (2013).
47. Although such risks should not be overblown, given that the UK is one of only a few
jurisdictions to have such laws in force. Award-creditors are free to seek enforcement in other
jurisdictions-albeit in relation to non-UK based assets.
48. ICSID, supra note 6, art. 55.

49. ICSID Model Clauses cl. 15, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (1993), http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/model-clauses-en/15.htm.

50. Joseph M. Cardosi, Precluding the Treasure Hunt: How the World Bank Group Can help
Investors Circumnavigate Sovereign Immunity Obstacles to ICSID Award Execution, 41 PEPP. L.

REv. 126, 128-30 (2013).
51. Id. at 128. (One wonders whether the recently leaked "Panama Papers" will provide
additional fodder for award-creditors. The Economist has noted, in this respect, that
"Governments are not alone in taking an interest. The [leaked] files will be a boon for corporate
investigators looking, say, to revive asset-search cases related to disputes."). See The Panama
Papers: A TorrentialLeak, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 9, 2016.

52. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012) (establishes the following exceptions from immunity: "(1) the
foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution
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to identify property used for "commercial activity," defined "by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose."53 In practice, securing attachment of
assets before Federal Courts is difficult, with courts sometimes going so far
as to sympathize with the plight of plaintiffs in having to conduct a
"nationwide search for attachable [assets]" before dismissing their motion
for reasons of political deference and international comity.54
Reportedly, reward-creditors fare slightly better in Europe,55 where some
home states are more inclined to pursue diplomatic remedies against the
respondent host state.56 Although, the travails of Franz Sedelmayer serve as
a cautionary tale: since obtaining an award of $2.3 million against Russia
pursuant to a BIT between Germany and Russia for an unlawful
expropriation in 1998, Mr. Sedelmayer to date has only managed to recover
$1.6 million after spending in excess of $5 million to seek attachment of
assets in domestic courts throughout Europe.57
The punch line is that, absent a host state's waiver of immunities, awardcreditors may struggle to cash in on awards. For the avoidance of any doubt,
award-creditors may face the same struggle to execute an ICSID award
whether or not such award arose from a breach of an investment contract or
a BIT violation. In practice, however, respondent states seem far more
hesitant to flout awards issued for a breach of contract-as such violations
are more difficult to justify: there are few credible defenses, for instance, to
either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign
state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or (2) the
property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based, or (3) the
execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has been taken in violation
of international law or which has been exchanged for property taken in violation of
international law, or (4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property-(A)
which is acquired by succession or gift, or (B) which is immovable and situated in the United
States: Provided, That such property is not used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or
consular mission or the residence of the Chief of such mission, or (5) the property consists of
any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such a contractual obligation to indemnify or
hold harmless the foreign state or its employees under a policy of automobile or other liability
or casualty insurance covering the claim which merged into the judgment, or (6) the judgment
is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign state, provided
that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with any provision
in the arbitral agreement, or (7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not
immune under § 1605A or § 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on Jan. 27, 2008),
regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is
based."
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). (establishing the rule of thumb, reportedly, is that if the
activity is one in which a private person could engage, it is not in principle entitled to
immunity). See Cardosi, supra note 50, at 133.
54. Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 786-87 (7th Cit. 2011).
55. See Cardosi, supra note 50, at 1, 38-44.
56. See Peterson, supra note 34.
57. James Kimer, How to Make Russia Pay its Debts: An Interview with Franz Sedelmayer,
ROBERT AMSTERDAM (Feb. 1, 2012), http://robertamsterdam.com/2012/02/how-to-makerussia- pay-its-debts-an-interview-with-franz-sedelmayer/.
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justify a breach of a government offtaker's payment obligations in a twentyyear power and purchase agreement, where the offtaker agrees to
remunerate the project company on a "take or pay" basis and the claimant
establishes that it complied with all material terms of the PPA, and the
public offtaker nevertheless failed to pay up. Failure to live up to contractual
obligations in such circumstances can be justified by nary compelling
sovereignty considerations.
Awards pursuant to a BIT are easier targets: after all, the respondent host
state may ask, what qualifies [the same] trio of unelected, unrepresentative
arbitrators to pass judgment on whether or to what extent a proenvironmental government regulation violates a FET provision? In other
words, states are more inclined to deem awards issued for BIT violations an
affront to their sovereignty.5 That host states eventually come around to
honor arbitral awards is not a given. Indeed, some states have doubled down
to renounce BIT obligations and withdraw from the ICSID Convention.
Over the past decade, these include Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
Notwithstanding the existence of so-called "sunset" provisions contained in
BITs, providing that BITs will remain in force for a number of years
following denunciation, the practical effect of a host state withdrawing from
BITs and the ICSID is to pull the rug out from under nervous BIT
investors. 59

M.
A.

The PRI Landscape
Tim PRI

MARKET

PRI policies can be obtained from the public and private sectors.
Providers across both sectors coexist with each other, not least of which on
account of the importance of reinsurance. PRI policies are priced before the
event. 60 The pricing of PRI policies, moreover, is not an exact science.
Political risk factors, distinct from other fields of insurance, are difficult to
58. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State
Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, be Repossessed By States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANS'L L.
689, 763 (2014).
59. Contra Frederic G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the
Denunciation ofInternationalInvestment Agreements, 11 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'L 11 L. 335, 363-96
(2013) (Sourgens argues the Westphalian "offer and acceptance" paradigm in international
relations, whereby a state is free to withdraw from a treaty, is inapposite to investor-state
treaties, particularly where rights have vested to investors. Sourgens challenges the notion that
a state can withdraw from such treaties at will, if the rights they confer to investors can be
viewed as unilateral acts to which they must be bound absent exigent circumstances. Sourgens
may very well be right that principles of good faith require a state to observe the modalities for
denunciation contained in specific treaty commitments. However, this will do little to ease
burdens on award-creditors to secure execution of assets, particularly where they would
(presumably) be reliant on their home state to enforce the host state's international law
obligations.).
60. Robert Ginsburg, Political Risk Insurance and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Making the
Connection, 14 J. OF WORLD INV. AND TRADE 943, 969 (2013).
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gauge and do not lend themselves easily to actuarial models.61 PRI product
suites will generally cover currency inconvertibility, political violence, and
expropriation. In addition to offering variations of these three policies,
private PRI providers tend to be more flexible with the scope and terms of
their offerings, although it is difficult to say more about terms concretely, as
private PRI providers often keep their contracts confidential.62 After
disbursing monies pursuant to a PRI policy claim, PRI providers are
typically subrogated to investors' claims against the host state. Public PRI
providers tend to do so pursuant to pre-existing treaties.63

As touched upon in the Introduction to this paper, national governments
have established agencies providing PRI products to their constituents. The
United States, after spinning off the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation ("OPIC") from the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID") in 1971, backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States government, pioneered the development of this market.
Other countries followed suit, with Export Development Canada, the
United Kingdom Export Finance, Australia's Export Finance and Insurance
Corporation ("EFIC"), and Japan's Nippon Export and Investment
Insurance ("NEXI") providing equivalent PRI products to qualifying
nationals and/or exports in developing country markets.64 Further, IGA's
entry into the market in 1988, to close the eligibility gaps caused by the
patchwork of national PRI providers, was followed, in due course, by the
growth of private insurer groups. The largest of these include the American
Insurance Group ("AIG"), Lloyd's London syndicate, and the Zurich
Financial Services Group.
Private PRI providers tend to offer products at shorter durationsranging from one to three years with the possibility of renewal, although a
number of insurers, led by AIG, have reportedly begun to offer terms of up
to fifteen years.6s Compared to public PRI providers, the process to obtain
coverage is speedier, and payouts are executed faster.66 In addition, over the
61. Kenneth W. Hansen, PRI and the Rise (and Fall?) of Private Investment in Public
Infrastructure,in PRIVATIZING DEVELOPMENT: TRANSNATIONAL LAW, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, 119 (Michael Likosky ed., 2005).
62. See NOAH RuumNs & NORMAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL
RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE 111 - 12 (2005).
63. See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency art. 57(b),
opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, 1508 U.N.T.S. 26012 (entered into force on Apr. 12, 1988).
OPIC bilateral agreements can be accessed at the following link: Bilateral Agreements, OPIC,
(last visited June 26, 2017). OPIC
https://www.opic.gov/content/bilateral-agreements
sometimes uses so-called "Fiduciary Agents" in countries that do not recognize subrogation.
See John S. Diaconis, Political Risk Insurance: OPIC's Use of a "FiduciaryAgent" to Facilitate
Resolution of Subrogation Claims, 23 INT'L L. 271, 271 (1989).
64. France and Germany, respectively COFACE and HERMES, delegated equivalent
functions to private entities.
65. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY [MIGA] & WORLD BANK GROUP,
WORLD INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL RISK 2013, 33 (2013).
66. Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 27, at 323, 327 (indicating that the length of time between
filing a claim and receiving a claim determination was 4.75 months). Further, while PRI
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past few years, insurance claims have tended to be paid out more by private
than by public providers.67 By some estimates, a full forty-eight percent of
investors purchase PRI coverage from the private sector. 68 Perhaps driven
by chronically low interest rates, these providers continue to increase the
size and breadth of their offerings.69 The flip side, however, is that private

policies can be quite expensive-so much so that some energy companies,
whose infrastructure projects abroad are particularly prone to adverse
government actions, deem such coverage not worth the threat of severe
loss.70

Public PRI providers tend to operate on a break-even basis. On balance,
they provide better financial terms to investors and on longer tenors than
private PRI providers. But public PRI products have at least six major
limitations from a prospective investor's standpoint. First, as mentioned
above, they are subject to strict nationality limits. Second, they generally
require all applicants to prove developmental or patriotic "additionalities."7'
Third, they require investors at all times to comply with environmental and
social safeguards, failing which they risk forfeiting their coverage. 72
Compliance with these safeguards can add substantially to project costs.
Fourth, they generally protect equity investments against their book value,
calculated on the basis of assets less liabilities, and debt obligations against
the unpaid amount of principal and interest otherwise due.73 This is worse
than the discounted cash flow ("DCF") method of valuation employed by
premium and cost information is not public information, MIGA reports that annual premiums
are believed to range from $25,000-$250,000 and could even reach in excess of $1 million
depending on the range of risk events covered by the policies. So-called "global risk policies"
tend to be the most expensive. See MIGA & WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD INVESTMENT
AND POLITIcAL RISK 2012, 45-46 (2012).
67. MIGA, supra note 65, at 40.
68. Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 27, at 337.
69. MIGA, supra note 65, at 30.
70. Michael Bradford, PoliticalRisk Insurance: A High Stakes Gamble for Oil, Gas Companies,
Bus. INs. (June 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20070617/
STORY/100022206.
71. Frequently Asked Questions, MIGA, https://www.niga.org/Pages/Who%20We%2OAre/
Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx#con4 (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) (MIGA requires applicants
to show proof of "development benefits of, and a long-term commitment to, the project."
OPIC gives priority to those projects that are responsive to the development needs of the host
states, respect workers' rights and avoids any tangible negative impact on the US economy.
"Additionally" also appears in a different context for OPIC insurance. OPIC typically requires
applicants to show that the insurance they seek is "additional," in the sense that the investment
would not proceed but for the insurance.). See Congressional Statement of Purpose; Creation
and Functions of Corporation, 21 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994).
72. See MIGA, Polity on Environmental and Social Sustainahility, (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www
.miga.org/documents/PolicyEnvironmental SocialSustainability.pdf; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 2191 (for OPIC).
73. See Sample Contract of Guarantee of Equity Investments art. 4.4 (2013); see also OPIC,
Handbook 18 (2015), http://opic.pfsfinance.com/pdf/OPIC Handbook.pdf.

598

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 3

most arbitral tribunals.74 Fifth, they are subject to relatively strict caps.
MIGA, for instance, has a yearly country coverage limit of $720 million (on
a net basis) with standard durations of between fifteen to twenty years,
although it can engage treaty and facultative reinsurance as well as
coinsurance to augment these capacity limits as needed.75 OPIC insures
investments up to $250 million for a maximum duration of twenty years,
although this cap can be increased to $400 million for oil and gas projects.76
Sixth, to minimize moral hazard risks, they tend not to cover the total
amount of the investment. MIGA insures a maximum of ninety percent of
equity investments, and ninety-five percent of debt investments.77 OPIC
caps investments at up to ninety percent8 of loss.

B.

PRI

COVERAGE: CONVENTIONAL POLICIES

In the following two sub-sections, I will discuss PRI policies, drawing from
OPIC determinations to illustrate how some of these policies have been
interpreted over time. It should be noted that OPIC is one of the more
transparent public PRI providers in this regard: MIGA, for instance, does
not make its claims determinations publicly available. This is in part to
avoid impliedly criticizing Member Countries in such determinations, and
because it has an excellent track record-disbursing only six claims since
1988, four of which resulted from war and civil disturbance.79
Currency inconvertibility coverage will typically require an investor to
show that it took all reasonable steps to transfer currency; the investor could
not complete the transfer owing to host state regulations; and the host state
issued these regulations after issuance of the PRI policy.so Once these
conditions are met, public PRI providers such as MIGA8' and OPIC2 will at
74. James J. Waters, A ComparativeAnalysis of Public and Private PoliticalRisk Insurance Policies
with Strategic Applicationsfor Risk Mitigation, 25 DuKE CoMiP. & INT'L L. J. 372, 372 (2015).
75. See MIGA, supra note 65.
76. OPIC, supra note 73, at 16.
77. MIGA, supra note 65; see OPIC, supra note 73.
78. See OPIC, supra note 73, at 28.
79. MIGA, Corporate Brochure, 7, https://www.miga.org/documents/corporate-brochure.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
80. See Waters, supra note 74, at 366.
81. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depolitization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of
ICSID and MIGA, ICSID REv.- FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J., 23-24 (1986) (MIGA, in its
Investment Guarantee Guide, describes its currency incontroverribility product as:
"[p]rotect[ing] against losses arising from an investor's inability to legally convert local currency
(capital, interest, principal, profits, royalties, and other remittances) into foreign exchange and/
or to transfer local currency or foreign exchange outside the country where such a situation
results from a government action or failure to act. Currency depreciation is not covered. In the
event of a claim, MIGA pays compensation in the currency specified in the contract of
guarantee."). See MIGA, Investment Guarantee Guide 2 (July 2015), https://www.miga.org/
documents/IGGenglish.pdf.
82. Sidney Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MICA, EXTMBANK and
Other Providers, 5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 59, 78-79 (1993).
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times simply buy up local currency and transfer a corresponding amount in
freely convertible currency to the insured investor, subject to the exchange
rate rules specified in the underlying policy. Investors should be mindful
that OPIC does not automatically approve currency inconvertibility claims
based on a host state's promulgation of restrictive regulation. Rather, the
policy holder, "using reasonable efforts, must not have been able to convert
Local Currency into U.S. dollars or to transfer U.S. dollars out of" the host
state.83
Political violence coverage, in turn, insures against losses from civil wars,
domestic unrests, revolutions, and "civil strife."84 PRI product purchasers
will typically purchase coverage for business income loss, covering an
investor until productive capacity is restored for up to a maximum duration,
normally of one year, and/or asset damage, with compensation based either
on the original cost of the asset, the fair market value at the time of loss, or
the cost of repair. When underwriting a political violence policy, OPIC will
generally look both to the general conditions in the host country, and the
specific conditions likely to affect the proposed project in particular.5 It
bears mentioning that OPIC has previously taken a permissive view of
causation, even in relation to civil strife, which OPIC defines as unrest that
86
does not rise to the level of an active civil war.

Last, expropriation coverage will typically cover the risk of direct seizure
or nationalization of assets by the host state in breach of international or
municipal law, which has the effect of confiscation by directly depriving the
insured of the use, control, or disposal of covered assets; although a growing
subset of such policies are increasingly addressing indirect expropriation
through adverse regulation that "deprive[s] the owner of its ability to
manage, use, or control its property in a meaningful way."87 These latter
policies may be better labeled as covering "creeping expropriation."88 Such
83. OPIC, MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATION IN THE INCONVERTIBILITY CLAIM OF FIRST
NEW YORK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ARGENTINA - CONTRACT OF INS. No. F181,
1 (2002).
84. See Waters, supra note 74, at 367. (Interestingly, MIGA's political violence policy extends
beyond acts imputable to the host state, and covers "not only violence in the host country
directed against a host country government, but also against foreign governments or foreign
investments, including the investor's government or nationality."). See MIGA, supra note 65, at
2.
85. See RUBINS AND KINSELLA, supra note 62, at 78-79.
86. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., OPIC Memorandum of Determination in the Political Violence
Claim of Tea Importers Inc. and C. W. Trading Company, Inc. Rwanda - Contracts of Ins. Nos. 9890,
9891, and 9969 (Sept. 30, 1996), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/teaimporters.pdf.
See also OPIC, MEMORANDUM OF DETERMINATIONS IN THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE CLAIM OF
SHELTER FOR LIFE INTERNATIONAL, INc. AFGHANISTAN - CoNTRACT OF INs. No. F.377
(Mar. 5, 2004).
87. UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II
EXPROPRIATION 2012, at 6-11, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, U.N. Sales No. E.12.I.D.7
(2012), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf.
88. See MIGA, supra note 65, at 2. ("[In addition to outright nationalization and confiscation,
"creeping" expropriation-a series of acts that, over time, have an expropriatory effect-is also

TRUST OF

600

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 3

expropriation must go beyond bad faith or violation of contractual
commitments, and rise to the level of a violation of the host state's
international legal obligations.89 Accordingly, mere harassment by local
government employees or the charging of excessive rates by such employees,
absent a confiscatory effect on the insured's property, will not usually
suffice.-o Moreover, OPIC will require an insured to exhaust all domestic
remedies before filing claims for expropriation, unless the host state acts in a
clearly arbitrary manner, or the insured is denied access to a judicial or
appellate body.91
C.

PRI COVERAGE: AAD

AND

DOJ

PRI providers, public and private, generally consider certain risks
inherently uninsurable. Such risks include those relating to currency
devaluation92 inflation and non-discriminatory regulation.93 An intermediate
category of risks that PRI providers cover, depending on whether they are
requested by an investor with a direct contractual relationship with the host
state, includes AAD and DOJ. I will address each in turn.
AAD coverage covers a host state's failure, ex post, to honor an arbitral
award. It is related to, but distinct from, expropriation coverage in that AAD
applies to any underlying commercial dispute between the investor and host
state that has been arbitrated, leading to an award for the investor that the
host state has refused to honor following "reasonable efforts" by the award-

-

covered. Coverage is available on a limited basis for partial expropriation (e.g., confiscation of
funds or tangible assets).").
89. See Rusms & KINSELLA, supra note 62, at 77 (In this respect, a denial of justice at the
municipal level, or arbitration award default would amount, would rise to the level of a violation
of international law.).
90. OPIC, Memorandum of Determination in the Confiscation Claim of Marine Shipping
Corporation, Egypt - ContractofIns. No. C015 (July 2, 1999), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/claim.marine-shipping.pdf.
91. OPIC, Memorandum of Determination in the Expropriation Claim of Citibank N.A, Sudan
Contracts of Ins. Nos. X002 and Annex XC796 (Sept. 22, 2000), https://www.opic.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/citibankclaim2000.pdf.
92. See Kenneth Hansen, New Product For Devaluation Risk, PROJEcr FINANCE NEwsWIRE
(Chadboune & Parke LLP), June 2001, at 9-12. (The first (and it seems only) project to be
guaranteed against devaluation risk, provided by OPIC for the Tiete hydroelectric generating
stations in Brazil, closed successfully in May 2001. Unfortunately, its timing coincided with the
September 11 attacks, which led to a period of relative divestment by U.S. investors abroad.
Demand for the product accordingly dropped, and it seems that OPIC has no plans to
reintroduce it in the near future.).
93. See Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 27, at 323.
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creditor to seek enforcement.94 OPIC will typically require that the award
remains unpaid for ninety days.95
The importance of arbitration in this context is that the PRI provider is
poorly placed to distinguish between actions by a host state justified by a
legitimate reason and impermissible political actions by the host state. 96 By
way of an illustration, returning to the above example of the public off-taker
in the previous part of this paper, if the respondent host state can establish in
proceedings that the investor was at fault, for instance, by failing to meet
contractual capacity generation requirements, its subsequent refusal to
honor its PPA take or pay obligations will likely be accepted as a valid
defense by an arbitral tribunal. If the host state fails to establish a breach by
the investor, in contrast, a tribunal will be more likely to find for the
investor. Where an insured alleges both expropriation and AAD, OPIC will
cap liability at the lesser of the sum of the unrecovered amounts covered by
all relevant policies or the insured's share of the arbitral award.97
DOJ covers a host state's failure, ex ante, to participate in arbitral
proceedings. DOJ coverage, which is offered as a stand-alone product or in
combination with AAD, applies to situations where an investor has
submitted a dispute for adjudication in a timely manner, following which the
host state committed a "wrongful act" in either failing or refusing to
participate in the adjudicatory proceedings with the result that adjudication
has been rendered "impossible." To prove impossibility, insurers will have
to be satisfied that the adjudicatory process has been rendered futile, been
obstructed, frustrated, or thwarted by the government, or been rendered
otherwise impractical or ineffective.98 There is more subjectivity at play
with DOJ claims, given that a cut off point for the insured's reasonable
efforts to seek justice has to be determined.99 Further, DOJ claims, more
94. "Reasonable efforts" normally calls upon the award-creditor to seek enforcement in the
court of the seat of arbitration, as opposed to seeking enforcement in other jurisdictions. See
Felton Johnson & Robert Wray, Insuring Arbitration Outcomes, PRI NEWSL. (Public Radio
Int'l), Oct. 2005 at 2. Some commentators argue that a host state's refusal to honor a validly
rendered international arbitration award may itself constitute an expropriation, triggering
OPIC's more general expropriation policy. See RuBINs & KINSELLA, supra note 62, at 81
(footnote 77, citing the U.S. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 712, comment h).
95. MARK KANTOR, ET. AL., REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
DETERMINATIONS p. 739 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (see the MidAmerican Energy Holdings
Determination).
96. FREDERICK JENNEY, POLITICAL
AwARDs, I

RISK

INSURANCE

FOR

COLLECTION

OF

ARBITRAL

DoAK BISHOP (ED), ENFORCEMENT OF ARBiTRAL AwARDs AGAINST SOVEREIGNS

p. 235 (JurisNet, LLC; Huntington, 2009).
97. OPIC, Memorandum of Determinations in the Expropriation Claim of MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company (formerly CalEnergy Company, In.), Indonesia - Contracts of Ins. Nos. E374,
E453, E527 and E759 (Nov. 1999), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/claim-midam
erican.pdf.
98. Id. at 230-232.
99. See Mark Kantor, InternationalProject Finance and Arbitration with Public Sector Entities:
When is ArbitrabilityA Fiction? 24 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 1122, 1122-83 (2000) (For an example
of a "clear cut" case, featuring tangible measures taken by the post-Suharto Indonesian
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than AAD claims, expose the insurer to greater salvage risk: inasmuch as a
host state may be unable to honor an AAD claim, the insurer's place as a
creditor is more readily defined than in relation to a DOJ claim, where its
salvage position may fall along a large pool of creditors whose debts will
surely be restructured after a considerable haircut.100 Last, it is unclear
whether or to what extent DOJ applies to actions of host state agencies, as
opposed to the host state itself, let alone whether such agencies may include
domestic courts.'(o
In one of the rare instances in which OPIC approved a DOJ claim, it drew
a distinction between actions of a host state to stall litigation adopted in a
commercial capacity, which would normally fall outside the scope of DOJ
coverage (but remediable through sanctions obtainable in local courts), and
actions of the host state taken in its official capacity in contravention of
international law, which could validly form the subject of a DOJ claim.102
That particular OPIC determination featured judicial determinations,
imputed to the Indian government, which applied Chevron-type deference
to the relevant administrative agency to defeat local relief against breach of
contract, and enjoined the insured from pursuing arbitral relief pursuant to
UNCITRAL rules.
To summarize, PRI providers offer BIT and Contract investors a range of
products to better insure their investments against the vagaries of host states.
Some of these, particularly policies covering against the risks of currency
inconvertibility and expropriation, address risks that are sometimes already
addressed in a BIT. No provider, however, is willing to offer AAD or DOJ
coverage to investors lacking a direct contractual relationship with the host
state. This excludes most BIT investors.
This exclusion seems odd, given that PRI risk evaluation is not an exact
science in the first place. It is noted in the literature that PRI providers
struggle to adequately price risks, ex ante, for BIT violations: whereas
government to frustrate international arbitration (including the kidnapping of an Indonesian
arbitrator from Amsterdam's Schipol Airport), which led to an OPIC payment of $217.5 million
to MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company, in December 1999, pursuant to a combined AAD/
DOJ policy.); see also, Memo of Determinations ... MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., supra note
95.
100. See Johnson & Wray, supra note 94.
101. Kenneth Hansen et. al., The Dabhol Power Project Settlement: What Happened? And How?
INFRAsTRUCTuRE J. (Dec. 2005), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/a5aale524285-4bb5-87e6-720112 3895a0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-4Ofca293-720d0b8f0ca8/DabholInfrastructureJournall2 (seeming as though OPIC will look to
impute liability for actions of the judiciary to the host state).
102. OPIC, Memorandum of Determinations in the Expropriation Claim of Bank of America, as
Trustee, India - Contract of Ins. No. F041 (Sept. 30, 2003), https://www.opic.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/BankofAmerica-September30-2003.pdf. (mentioning that the OPIC determination
was not the end of the matter-payments due to the insured's lender, for missed loan
repayments, totaled $28 million, against the asset's $300 million valuation. Workout
arrangements-including ensuing litigation pursuant to the India-Mauritius BIT-are detailed
in Hansen, supra note 101.).
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Contract investors, through liquidated damage clauses, will typically
"anchor" a host state's liability for default in underlying contracts. BIT
investors, in contrast, will not have agreed on any liability caps with the host
state. The literature further notes that DOJ providers, in particular, in
addition to facing salvage risks, are exceptionally hesitant to insure foreign
court proceedings that are less clearly delineated in the first place, or that are
03
clearly delineated but capable of being subverted at will by the host state.
Where a Contract investor is required to first adjudicate in local courts, the
nature of these foreign proceedings does not change. Nevertheless, a DOJ
provider may be more confident of characterizing a court's refusal to award
damages pursuant to a contract with the host state as a denial of justice in
such proceedings than it is in relation to a BIT investor's claim that the host
state's actions in analogous proceedings have breached, for instance, the
state's FET obligation. This may well be true. Nevertheless, it ignores the
possibility that PRI providers can limit their overall exposure through policy
limits and charge risk premia to reflect the uncertainties.IV.

A.

Risk Mitigation Strategies for BIT Investors

BITS

AND

PRIs

NEED NOT OPERATE IN SILOS

There are some striking similarities between the protections an investor
can derive from BITs and PRI products, particularly in relation to risks from
This has led some
currency inconvertibility and expropriation.
commentators to suggest that BITs and PRI products are substitutes.105

I

would contend that this presents a false dichotomy. There are important
situations in which BITs and PRI products reinforce each other. For one,
skittish investors may not make investments in a host country at all in the
absence of some form of PRI coverage. Conversely, one can fathom of a
situation where the absence of a provision on subrogation in a BIT might
dissuade a particularly risk-averse private insurer from granting any such
coverage where there is a strong possibility that the insured's financial health
may not survive adverse host state action long enough to pursue BIT
arbitration.106

The claim that BITs and PRI products are substitutes ignores some
important differences. To highlight just a few: on eligibility, investors can
claim the protection of a BIT if their investment is a covered investment
103. See Jenney, supra note 96, at 231.
104. Such limits would include, at a minimum, a cap on overall exposure, and onerous
"reasonable efforts" requirements on the insured's part to secure adjudication.

105. Bekker & Ogawa, supra note 27, at 335-336.
106. See Draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 9.13, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf. (For instance, PRI protection for energy generation projects
in developing countries, are typically sought out by project companies operating on a nonrecourse basis. Any host nation action that frustrates a project company's ability to repay
commercial lenders might sink such a company, exposing the PRI provider to the possibility
that it may not have standing to pursue the insured's claim.).
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within the meaning of the underlying BIT; whereas public PRI providers
limit eligibility to nationals and/or exports.10 7 Further, investors may forfeit
coverage under public PRI policies if they fail to abide by environmental and
social safeguard obligations.ios On remedies, damages for breach of a BIT are
calculated, ex post, by an arbitral tribunal; whereas the maximum coverage of
a PRI product is negotiated ex ante. On calculation methods, BIT damages are
generally based on the DCF method; whereas the more affordable PRI
products cover ninety percent or less of an investment's net book value. On
sequencing, BIT damages are, in principle, due upon issuance of an award, or
following execution in domestic courts; whereas payments pursuant to a PRI
policy, depending on the risk insured, are either due immediately, following
certain "cooling off" periods, or at the close of arbitral proceedings.- On
substantive coverage, although the protection offered by BITs can change over
time,i"o such changes are unlikely to affect the narrow definition of
expropriation, and add much specificity to circumstances amounting to FET
violatiofis; whereas PRI products, whose terms can only change over time if
amended by both the insurer and insured, adopt a wider definition of
expropriation, but do not insure for alleged breaches of FET, MFN or NT
violations. On scope, arbitral tribunals are slow to accept that BIT umbrella
clauses render mere contractual breaches justiciable;"' whereas AAD and
DOJ coverage will insure against such breaches where the state refuses
either to participate in related adjudicative proceedings or honor an arbitral
award.
On confidentiality, investment arbitration proceedings are
increasingly public; whereas the settlement of a PRI claim is confidential.112
On counterparty obligations, investors are not under any strict obligation to
mitigate their losses; whereas PRI products generally oblige insureds to give
immediate notice of loss (or even anticipated loss), and take all reasonable
steps to avert further loss. Last, on terms, where BITs and PRI products
seem to overlap, they may do so under very different circumstances. A
dispute concerning a breach of a currency inconvertibility provision in a
BIT, for instance, will normally fix the exchange rate on the day upon which
the host state failed to honor the transfer; whereas under a PRI policy, the
prevailing exchange rate may be that which applies at the end of the "cooling
107. Private PRI providers will, if anything, premise eligibility around the minimum value of
the investment to be protected.
108. See IAN LAIRD ET AL., INVEsTmENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND

INTERNATIONAL LAw p.
345 (JurisNet, LLC; Huntington, 2015) (showing that the contours of comparative fault in
investment arbitration, in contrast, is unsettled).
109. See Williams, supra note 82, at 79. (asserting that currency inconvertibility products
offered by public PRI providers typically requires an insured to wait a number of days before
being paid, as the PRI provider seeks to negotiate a resolution with the host state).
110. By virtue of the MEN clause.
111. Compare SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, (Aug. 6,
2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0779.pdf, with SGS v.
Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0782.pdf.
112. Subject, however, to the statutory reporting requirements of public PRI providers.
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off' period, which could be as long as 240 days. For investors in Argentina,
whether the amounts were to be disbursed on day zero or day 240 made a
significant difference.13
What these differences illustrate is that BIT investors, by availing
themselves of PRI products tailored to the specificities of the underlying
BIT, can minimize their risks. Specifically, such investors can purchase PRI
products that plug important gaps in BIT coverage. If an investor is
concerned about the absence of a provision on currency inconvertibility in a
BIT, for instance, but reassured by the politically stable situation in a host
state, and thus, unconcerned by the risk of expropriation, it can purchase a
currency inconvertibility product without having to pay anywhere between
500 to 1000 basis points more for a comprehensive "all risk" product that
adds these other two products.114

Conversely, if the host nation's currency is stable, but the BIT contains an
NPM clause, this would arguably allow a host state to expropriate an
investor's plant downstream for an infinitely wide panoply of "essential
security interests.""1s In such circumstances, a prudent investor may want to
ignore currency inconvertibility coverage altogether, and pay more for an
elaborate expropriation policy from a private PRI provider that covers its
investment against a DCF valuation, thereby insulating it from the risk that
it incur considerable litigation expenses for a period of years without any
clear prospects of ultimately succeeding before an arbitral tribunal. Were
the investor to have ignored a careful review of -the BIT (and its NPM
clause), and either obtained no PRI coverage at all, or obtained a basic PRI
product suite securing its investment against a portion of the net book value
of its equity investment, it will have been much worse off.
It is surprising, then, that empirical evidence suggests that neither
16
investors nor PRI providers review BITs in the underwriting process.
This evidence highlights instead that double taxation treaties rank higher in
importance for prospective investors."? For those PRI providers surveyed,
113. Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 958-62.
114. For energy infrastructure projects, "all risks" products are more frequently termed
"Comprehensive Contractors Plant & Equipment" coverage. Examples of these can be found
2
at the following links: http://www.beazley.com/documents/Political%20Risks%20and% 0
2
2
Trade%2OCredit/Comprehensive%2OContractors%20Plant%20Equipment% OCover% 03
%20Wording.pdf (Beazley); http://www.aicg.co.uk/CMDownload.aspxContentKey=f 38e84d8c04-40db-al7c-51e06984ca98&ContentItemKey=dcb27286-dda3-4b21-ae82-214226886f88
(AICG).
115. Assuming such NPM clause is "self-judging," in the sense of allowing the host state to
determine what constitutes such interests.
116. Jason Webb Yackee, Do BilateralInvestment Treaties PromoteForeign Direct Investment? Some
Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 400 (2010); Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen,
The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the
Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLIcY 2009-2010 548-49
(Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010) (Yackee conducted his own survey, whereas Poulsen, at footnote 42,
analyzed the results of surveys from UNCTAD (2007) and a China-specific study).
117. Poulsen, supra note 116, at 549.
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most indicated either that they did not take BITs into account at all in their
18
or noted their existence as a general indicator that
underwriting process,s
the country in question was open, in principle, to foreign investment. One
study found, using regression analyses, that the most important political risk
variable for PRI providers was a country's lagged value of the political riskin other words, a country's perceived level of risk over the most recent
years.11 9 None of the studies revealed a principled or doctrinal reason for
disregarding BITs in investment or underwriting decisions. Rather, it seems
that survey respondents across-the-board were simply unaware of their
existence.
Once apprised of their purpose, moreover, the majority of respondents
were doubtful that they would amend their underwriting process to take
BITs into account.1 20 Yet, the above analysis shows that a review of a BIT
prior to issuing PRI coverage can give a PRI provider a better understanding
of the types of protections an insured might benefit from under the BIT that
overlaps with PRI product coverage. To be sure, this will not systematically
be the case-and such reviews can take time and cost money.121
Nevertheless, in those situations where a BIT provides protections that are
similar to the types of risks that the insurer is covering, and the host state has
a good compliance record, prospective PRI product purchasers would be
well advised to seek lower premia from PRI providers to account for the
reduced risks provided by the BIT. PRI providers ready and willing to
oblige, let alone those inclined to proactively offer reduced premia,
moreover, could stand to be rewarded with more business.122
One author claims that the disconnect between BITs and PRI runs deeper:
investor-state practitioners are also generally unaware of the dual role PRI
products can play to reduce investment risks and insurance premiums.123
The result is that those prospective investors being advised by lawyers or
insurers are likely being given incomplete risk analyses. It is hoped that this
collective ignorance will dissipate as a growing number of BITs continue to
be signed and investment awards publicized and critically reviewed.

B.

Tm

IMPORTANCE OF

AAD

AND

DOJ MOvING

FORWARD

The possibility of creating a more comprehensive political risk
management program outlined immediately above may go a long way
118. Yackee, supra note 116, at 400.
119. Id. at 421 (referencing risk rating agency data).
120. Id. at 424; Poulsen, supra note 116, at 552. (The one anomaly, referred by Poulsen,
strangely enough, related to the Brazilian PRI industry. Six Brazilian PRI providers surveyed in
the course of UNCTAD's Policy Review of Brazil displayed a knowledge of BITs, and indicated
that these were sometimes factored into underwriting decisions. Brazil is the largest economy
not to have signed a BIT with any trading partner. Further, it is not an ICSID Member
Country.).
121. Particularly when consulting an investment arbitration law firm.
122. See Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 970, n.78.
123. Id. at 944.
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towards offering some measure of compensation to the BIT investor. There
are situations, however, in which investors will want to be covered for more
than ninety percent the net book value of its investment. Yet, such investors
may balk at paying the fees that a private PRI provider will charge for more
comprehensive coverage. 124 Faced with the prospects of paying large fees,
they may decide to play the odds and fall back on the protections afforded by
a BIT. If the economic value of an investor's assets is later reduced by
adverse host state action (or inaction), the investor will have to either
internalize its losses or seek out funding in any way that it can to pursue BIT
litigation. In the absence of AAD and DOJ coverage, one such funding
avenue has proven to be TPF, which can be problematic for reasons I will
discuss further below.
Sometimes, TPF may present the only possible avenue, ex post adverse
host state action, for BIT investors in dire financial straits. One such
investor, Crystallex, reportedly issued five-year senior secured notes
accompanied by a contingent value right entitling the bearer to a percentage
(thirty percent) of any BIT award recovered by the company in an action
against Venezuela for nationalizing an untapped mineral deposit that it had
received the right to exploit.125 Its issuance attracted little interest, however,
and it filed for bankruptcy protection from the Ontario Supreme Court a
few months after issuance. The court approved debtor-in-possession
financing of $36 million, provided by a United States hedge fund run by
Tenor Capital Management, to allow the company "to fund its operations,
including the prosecution of its arbitration claim against the government of
Venezuela."126 Crystallex received a $1.4 billion ICSID award, likely earning
Tenor Capital Management a healthy return on its investment.127

Investors like Crystallex will typically consult TPF brokers to seek out
funders willing to provide non-recourse financing to cover all or parts of the
costs and disbursements needed to pursue a claim. Not much is known
about these funders or their underlying motivations. Funders may offer
financing in return for full recovery of their costs plus a reasonable share of
any award issued, or be motivated by the "test" aspects and precedential
prospects of a given dispute. Rules for such arrangements vary per
jurisdiction.128 Concerns across virtually all these jurisdiction are linked to
public policy considerations, dating back to the Medieval-era prohibitions
on champerty and maintenance; conflicts of interests, between funder and

-

124. Bradford, supra note 70, at 18.
125. Sebastian Perry, Claimant Sells Securities Linked to ICSID Award, GLOB. ARB. REv. (Oct.
28, 2011) (stating that the offering was for $120 million).
126. Sebastian Perry, Funder On Boardfor New Venezuela Claim, GLOB. ARB. R. (June 20, 2012).
127. Nathan Crooks, COystallex Awarded $1.4 Billion in Venezuela Arbitration Case, BLOOMBERG
4
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-05/crystallex-awarded-1billion-in-venezuela-arbitration-case.
128. See Aren Goldsmith & Lorenzo Melchionda, Third Party Funding in International
Arbitration:Everythingyou Ever Wanted to Know (but were Afraid to Ask) - PartI, 2012 INT'L Bus.
L. J. 53, 56-63 (such rules may be relevant insofar as the law of the relevant country applies, or
when the investor seeks execution of an award in relevant domestic courts).
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investor, particularly on the issue possible settlements, funder and counsel,
where counsel provided by the funder has agreed to discounted fee rates and
caps,1 29 and, possibly, arbitrator and funder; in addition to questions of
admissibility relating to who "owns" the claim in the absence of any treaty
provisions addressing assignment or subrogation.130
TPF will do little to ease concerns over the optics of the "fairness" of
investment arbitration, particularly if pre-existing ties between funders and
arbitrators, however remote, begin to surface downstream. TPF is
unnecessary to provide bridge funding to BIT investors, given the constant
and high growth in the PRI market.131 Caterisparibus, TPF money accepted
by BIT investors may represent lost sales of AAD and DOJ products for PRI
providers.
I have demonstrated in the previous Part that DOJ providers can
adequately limit their exposure when insuring a BIT investor. Nevertheless,
if we choose to express some sympathy, however irrational, for the
difficulties of pricing DOJ meaningfully in the absence of detailed contracts
with the host state, these sympathies cannot possibly extend to the refusal,
by PRI providers, to offer AAD coverage to BIT investors. Inasmuch as
insurers fear that such products will be oversubscribed, this is unlikely to
occur for an important reason: for many investors, the prospects of litigating
before an international tribunal for little under four years on average will not
protect their bottom line. But, it presents a more transparent alternative to
TPF.
It would seem that extending the scope of AAD coverage is not a priority
issue for PRI providers. Yet, some precedent exists: one author describes his
successful structuring of what, in essence, was a dispute settlement swap with
MIGA, which enabled MIGA to pursue a claim for expropriation under the
more favorable definition of expropriation in the underlying BIT relative to
the MIGA Convention.132 Rather than pursue such complex structures, PRI
providers could initially market AAD coverage to BIT investors at a
conservative margin of 1000 basis points or so.1 33 Should PRI providers balk
at doing so for whatever reason, MIGA should take the lead and pilot an
expanded AAD product, accounting for it either in its yearly country limits
or, initially, through a set-aside fund.34
The problem of the enforcement gap is not going away anytime soon:
MIGA's most recent investment report notes an uptick in demand for PRI
129. Roula Harfouche & James Searby, Third-Party Funding: Incentives and Outcomes, 2013
AND AFR. ARB. REv. 10, 10-14 (2013).
130. Id. at 10-14. See also, Aren Goldsmith & Lorenzo Melchionda, Third Party Funding in
InternationalArbitration:Everything you Ever Wanted to Know (but were Afraid to Ask) - Part II,
2012 INT'L Bus. L. J. 221, 221-30 (2012).
131. MIGA, supra note 56.
132. See Hansen, supra, note 19, at pp. 10-12.
133. Id. at 9.
134. See Cardosi, supra note 4, at 147-55 (for proposals on how the World Bank Group can
each play a part to bolster BIT compliance). See also Kantor, supra note 43, at 22.
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products for investments in the Middle East and North Africa, coinciding
with an increase in breach of contract disputes in global and regional
arbitration centers.135 As more and more investors seek high returns in
frontier markets, the enforcement gap will continue to grow wider.
V.

Conclusion

State consent is the sine qua non for international investment arbitration.
When ICSID was designed in 1965, its drafters anticipated that host state
consent would be granted on a case-by-case basis, and operate as the
jurisdictional bottleneck. BITs altered this, and the ICSID Secretariat has
been playing catch-up since: ICSID's Caseload Statistics report for 2016, for
instance, indicates a dramatic spike in annual cases registered after 1996.
Prior to that point, cases registered barely exceeded a maximum of three a
year. From 1997 to 2015, as BITs proliferated, no less than twenty-seven
cases were registered per year, with a historic high of fifty-two cases
registered in 2015 alone. As of December 31, 2015, ICSID has registered
549 cases under its Convention and Additional Facility.136 The basis of
consent invoked in these cases, sixty point three percent of the time, was
contained in a BIT provision.137
ICSID arbitration is growing increasingly lengthy and costly. Winning
before an ICSID tribunal, further, is no guarantee of satisfaction. The
constitutional laws of many Member Countries contemplate the possibility
of vacating or reducing final awards on a number of grounds, encompassing
due process considerations in addition to public policy concerns. These
grounds, it follows, extend well beyond the grounds for annulment that
parties to ICSID proceedings can cite to set aside an award. While comity
and policy considerations have stopped domestic courts to date from
exercising too much activism with respect to ICSID awards, nothing in law
stops them from doing so in the future.
There is more: the list of non-compliant states continues to grow. As I
have shown above, execution of an award is fraught with difficulties, whether
or not a state waives immunity from attachment. When host states disregard
BIT awards, they typically frame the awards as an affront to their
sovereignty. In some instances, host states may follow through by
denouncing BITs altogether. This leaves BIT investors in a precarious state
of affairs.
These developments are to some degree unsurprising: respondent host
states may not have realized what they were signing up for when they
incorporated ICSID arbitration clauses into BITs. ICSID, in turn, was never
meant to operate as a comprehensive remedy to a host state's failure to

-

135. MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2013, supra note 65, at 44.
136. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload
Statistics Issue 1, at 7 (2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20
Web%20Stats%202016-1%20(English)%20final.pdf.
137. Id. at 10.
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honor contractual or treaty obligations. World Bank Group risk mitigation
products, particularly relating to PRI, were designed to supplement such
obligations. Over time, the PRI market grew out of sync with developments
in the international investment treaty law. But, the PRI market is growing
robustly as more investors demand PRI products to insure investments
abroad. PRI products can enhance a BIT investor's risk mitigation
management program, and lower insurance costs.
It is, therefore, surprising that the literature reports an almost total lack of
cross-fertilization between investor-state practitioners and PRI providers.
This lack of cross-fertilization has, inter alia, stalled innovation in the PRI
market. The lack of suitable PRI products, moreover, has led some BIT
investors seeking to raise litigation funds down more desperate paths, none
more so than TPF. Vvhile TPF can sometimes represent an investor's only
hope of raising monies to litigate an investment arbitration claim, the
absence of uniform rules disciplining recourse to TPF and a lack of
transparency concerning the identities and motivations of funders at present
may further heighten concerns over the fairness of investment arbitration.
It is hoped that PRI providers and BIT investors will better scrutinize the
protections provided by a BIT when negotiating PRI product coverage.
Selective PRI coverage can better insulate BIT investors from the risks of
adverse government actions, particularly where such actions could threaten
the very survival of the underlying investment. PRI providers, in turn,
should factor the protections offered by BITs in their underwriting process,
where such protections can be said to meaningfully reduce risks.
AAD and DOJ coverage, in particular, can make an investor whole where
a host state refuses either to participate in arbitral proceedings or honor an
arbitral award. There is no principled reason why PRI providers should not
extend at least AAD coverage to BIT investors. Such policies can be
introduced on a trial basis, priced conservatively, and subjected to maximum
liability caps. Once the market for AAD products insuring BIT arbitrations
matures, DOJ products can similarly be rolled out on a trial basis.
Going forward, investors and PRI providers will also need to come
together to fundamentally rethink the pricing of PRI products. Rather than
focusing on a purely actuarial approach, it may be more instructive to fall
back on some common sense linked, in part, to the problem of obsolescence
bargaining. If one accepts that the risk of adverse host state action may be
greater in situations where an investor is perceived to give little back to the
local communities (and there is no reason to assume otherwise), it follows
that the converse must be true: if the investor gives the host state and local
communities a more equitable piece of the proverbial pie, they are less likely
to find themselves at the business end of an expropriation. PRI products
should thus be priced according to the local benefits an investor's project
stands to generate.
Although public PRI providers already consider the positive spillovers of a
project, the criticism is that they either do so mechanically or are primarily
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concerned with advancing national foreign policy objectives abroad138-and
in the narrower framework of deciding whether or not to grant funding in
the first place. Were they to create incentive structures whereby risk
premiums are lowered in inverse correlation with developmental impacts,
they could economize on payouts, and deliver more fully on their
environmental and social mandates.

138. Ashton Inniss, Rethinking Political Risk Insurance: Incentives for Investor Risk Mitigation, 16
Sw. J. INT'L L. 477, 489 (2010).

